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INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS: IS ITS BARK WORSE THAN ITS BITE IN
RESOLVING HUMAN RIGHTS DISPUTES?
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Americas, unimaginable atrocities happen to individuals that rock the
very foundation of human conscience and human dignity. Individuals everyday are

extrajudicially executed, persecuted, threatened, abducted never to be found, beaten,
raped, stripped of their ability to reason for themselves, and denied the right to an
education and religious freedom.' For centuries these atrocities have taken place

unpunished or unquestioned.
International concern for human rights violations has finally catapulted into
action many measures to address these issues.2 The United Nations (U.N.)
established the United Nations Charter which addresses its promotion of respect for

human rights.'
Slowly, states are beginning to recognize human rights as a serious international
concern and have established different charters which address the human rights
issues.4 The charters, however, are vague because they do not clearly set out the
rights to be promoted or respected.5

1. See generally Barry Bearak, TalibanMilitiaaccused of Bloody Mayhem, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRin., Nov.
7, 1999,atA28(miitiamurderedindividuals, destroyedcrops, andbutcheredindividuals' livestock);AppealtoProtect
Civilians, AmE. NEWS SERv., Oct. 21, 1999 (Pg. Unavail. Online)(government armed forces murdered and abducted
individuals); Cameroon'sHumanRightsRecordUnderScrutinyby UN,AFR. NEWS SERV., Oct. 27,1999(Cameroon
security forces are extrajudicially executing, torturing, and beating prisoners); bon Villelabeitia, Report reveals
GuatemalaBrutality,ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 26,1999, at A12; (U.S. accused of helping to perpetuate the civil
war which caused a lot ofdeaths in Gautemalaby military officials); Russ Christensen, As Someone Who Has Worked
for Human Rights in CentralAmerica...,BANGOR DAILY NEws, Mar. 10,1999 (military and police forces killed over
two hundred thousand Guatemalan citizens); Log Details Guatemala Killings by Secret Military Unit in 1980s,
DESERET NEWS, May 21, 1999, at Al 8 (secret Guatemalan military unit kidnapped, tortured and executed men and
women). See also Scott Splittberger, The Need ForGreaterRegionalProtectionForthe Human Rights of Women:
The Cases ofRape In Bosnia and Guatemala, 15 WIS.INT'LLJ. 185 (1996) (military officials and political leaders
exploit women and consider rape as a means of power and to further military goals).
2. Some treaties that have been enacted include the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture,
Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, Inter-American Convention on the Prevention,
Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women, The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
and American Convention on Human Rights. Several commissions have also been established. These include, but are
not limited to,UnitedNations Commission onHumanRights, Inter-American Commission onHuman Rights, European
Commission on Human Rights and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights.
3. "Article 1(3) of the United Nations Charter listed its promotion ofrespect for human rights among its purposes
and principles." U.N. CHARTER art. 1para. 3. The U.N. Charter further states in Article 55 that "it shall promote
without distinction as to race,
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
sex, language, or religion." U.N. CHARTER art. 55. In Article 56, "all United Nation members pledge themselves to take
joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article
55." U.N. CHARTER art. 56. These articles of the U.N. Charter are also cited in LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE OAS AND
THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF H

AN Rars

2 (1977).

4. The United Nations Charter, the Charter of the OAS, and the Statute of the Council of Europe are examples.
See generally LEBLANC, supra note 3, at 2. (discussing how states that have established systems to address human
rights issues); see alsoTHOMAS BUERGENTHAL & DINAH SHELTON, PROTECTING HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS:
h
CASES AND MATERIALS (4t ed. 1995)(discussing regional systems for the protection of human rights).

5. See LEBLANC, supranote 3, at 2.
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It was for this reason that those who advocated international human rights
pressed hard in the post-war years for the adoption of declarations, covenants, and
conventions which would give greater meaning to obligations already assumed, or
would create new, more meaningful obligations. Many obligations have been
adopted. Numerous international human rights agencies have also been created,
though they differ from each other in terms of their structure, functions, and the
degree of independence and objectivity with which they have performed their
6
tasks.
Thehuman rights movementhas encountered serious difficulties and obstacles.7
Countries do not often address the human rights confronting them.8 Individual rights
are abused and, in many instances, the countries themselves are responsible for these

human rights violations. There are numerous cases in which the military and officials
are the main culprits of human rights violations. 9 Consequently, human rights
disputes arise and protocol agencies are created to address these disputes."0
Finally, in the late twentieth century, the nations of the Americas have moved
to take action against these heinous crimes against persons. Out of this concern for

human rights violations in the Americas came the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights. The Organization for American States (OAS) has numerous
references to human rights included in its charter."
The purpose of this comment is to explore one particular protocol, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and to review its effectiveness

in resolving human rights disputes before it. This comment will explore the opinions

6. Id.at 2-3. TheUnited Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights in 1948.
In the ensuing years it has adopted, and thus opened for ratification, numerous conventions and covenants, some of
which deal with specific subjects such as racism and the rights ofwomen. Two of which, adopted in 1966, are ofa more
general nature: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (and an Optional Protocol to it), and the
International CovenantonEconomic, Social, and Cultural Rights. In 1950 the Council of Europe adopted theEuropean
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and it has since been ratified by the great
majority of member States and has entered into force. The European Social Charter, which has also entered into force,
affirms a group ofrights commonly referred to as economic, social, and cultural rights. In 1948, the American States
adopted the American Declaration of the Rights of Man; in 1969 the American Convention on Human Rights was
adopted and thus opened for ratification by member states of the OAS. Examples include the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights created by the Economic and Social Council in 1946; the European Commission on
Human Rights which function as organs implementation of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms; and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), created by resolution of the
Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in 1959. See id.
7. See id. at 4.
8. See Victimsofthe Tugboat"13 de Marzo" v. Cuba, Case No. 1.436, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 45, OEA/ser.LJVJII,
doc. 95, rev. 7 (1996) (Cuba would not recognize the petitioners request to retrieve the drowned bodies ofthe sinking
tugboat and did not punish those responsible for the drowning).
9. See Patriotic Union v. Colombia, Case No. 11.227, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 45, OEA/ser.LJV.ll, doc. 95, rev. 7
(1997) (political party alleged that its membership suffered persecution in the form of extrajudicial executions,
disappearances, unfounded criminal prosecutions by the government); Pratdesaba Barillas v. Guatemala, Case No.
8074, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 45, OEA/ser.LJVJII., doc. 95 rev. 7 (1996) (military officials abducted the victim from his
home); Rosario Congo v. Ecuador, Case No. 11.427, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 45, OEA/ser.L/V/II., doc. 95 rev. 7 (1996);
(guards assaulted and killed a prisoner).
10. See LEBLANC, supra note 5, at 3.
11. See id.Article 13 ofthe original Charter, Article 16 of the revised Charter which provides that "Each State has
the right to develop its cultural, political and economic life freely and naturally. In this free development, the State shall
respect the rights of the individual and the principles of universal morality." See id.
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and enforcement mechanisms of the IACHR. Section II will discuss the background
of the IACHR by laying out the framework of the IACHR and expaining how it
theoretically functions. In Section III, this comment will show how the IACHR
actually works in practice, focusing on four cases in this area: Victims of the Tugboat
"13 de Marzo" v. Cuba,'2 PratdesabaBarillasv. Guatemala,13 Rosario Congo v.
Ecuador,14 and Montoya Gonzalez v. Costa Rica.' In Section IV, this comment
concludes with a discussion on how the theory and actual practice of the IACHR
interplay realistically with each other and whether the IACHR is ineffective or not in
resolving human rights disputes.
II. HISTORY OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS
A. Formationof IACHR
In 1959, the IACHR was formed by a resolution of the Fifth Meeting of the
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.' 6 The IACHR was created as a selfgoverning entity of the Organization of American States. During the 1959 meeting,
the political climate of the OAS advocated progress in the human rights area. 7 The
Member States' representatives adopted a two-part resolution, 8 with the secondpart
of the resolution not as well received as the first. 19 In 1960, the statute was adopted,
establishing the IACHR. 20 However, the IACHR did not have much power,
prompting the OAS to adopt the Protocol of Amendment to the OAS Charter which

12.
13.
14.
15.

Case No. 11.436, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 45, OEA/ser.LJVJII, doc. 95, rev. 7 (1996).
Case No. 8074, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 45, OEAser.LJVJI., doe. 95 rev. 7 (1996).
Case No. 11.427, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 45, OEA/ser.L.VJII., doc. 95 rev. 7 (1996).
Case No. 11.553, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 45, OEA/ser.L/V.II, doc. 95, rev. 7 (1996).

16. See generallyRICHARD B. LILUCH & HusrHANNUM, INTERNATIoNALHUMAN RGHTS: PROBLEMS OFLAW,
PoucY, AND PRACTICE 782-83 (3d ed. 1995). See also ANNAP. SCHREmER, THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON
KARELVAAKLACOMMSIONINERAMERICAINEDESDROrrS DEL'HOmME(1968); THOMAS
HumANRIrs (1970);
t
BLERGENTHAL & DINAH SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: CASES AND MATERIALS (4f ed.
1995); ScoTr DAVIDSON, THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM (1997); LEBLANC, supra note 5.

17. See DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 15.
18. See id. at 15-16. "The first part of the Resolution VIII called upon the Inter-American Juridical Committee to
draft a convention on human rights and a convention for the creation of an Inter-American Court of Human Rights or
other organizations 'appropriate for the protection and observance of those rights.' This part of the resolution was
adopted unanimously. The second part of the resolution called upon the Permanent Council of the OAS to create an
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights composed of seven members elected, as individuals, by the Council of
the Organization of American States from panels of three presented by the governments. The Commission, which shall
be organized by the Council of the Organization and have the specific functions that the Council assigns to it, shall be
charged with furthering respect for such rights." See id.
19. See id. at 16. "Although fifteen Member States voted in favor of Resolution VIII., Brazil, the Dominican
Republic, Mexico and Uruguay voted against it, while Bolivia and the US abstained. Once again, the main reason for
opposing the creation of an Inter-American Commission was the fear on the part of some states that it would have the
power to intervene in internal affairs. Nonetheless, in accordance with the mandate ofthe Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, the Council established a committee to draft a statute for the proposed Affairs, the Council established
a committee to draft a statute for the proposed Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. After the submission
of a number of drafts to the Member States, the Council finally adopted the Statute of the Commission after excising
a right of individual petition to the Commission which had been included in the Committee's final draft." See id.
20. See id.
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added important
provisions to the human rights area and expanded the power of the
2t

IACHR.
The IACHR was originally conceived as a study group whose purpose was to
perform "abstract investigations in the human rights area." 2 Creators of the IACHR
did not realize the effect that the establishment of this organization would have on
"human rights violations for individual victims."'
Complaints were sent to the
IACHR concerning human rights violations immediately after it was known that the
IACHR had been created.24
A major part of the IACHR's work included addressing the problems of
countries "with gross, systematic violations of human rights."
This was in large
part due to the nonexistence or lack of effectiveness in the protection of human rights
and minimal cooperation on the part of governments concerned.2 6 In a world
inundated with heinous human rights atrocities, the IACHR was thought to be the
2
"sole protector" of human rights violationsY.
However, the IACHR was part of an
organization where human rights violations were not a primary concern which
affected how the IACHR dealt vith these issues.28
Under Article 1 § 1 of the IACHR statute, the IACHR "was created to promote
the observance and defense of human rights and to serve as consultative organ of the
Organization in this matter., 29 Defending human rights is the basic model for the
IACHR's activities. 30 Article 1 §2(a)-(b) of the statute goes further to enumerate

21. From those member states of the OAS present for the Third Special Inter-American Conference, 18 member
states ratified the Protocol of Amendment to the Charter by February 27, 1970, which is the date of entry into force.
See Protocolof Buenos Aires, (visited October 31, 1999) <http:lwww.oas.org/ENIPROG/Juridico/englisblsigslb.
31.html>. "The member states ratifying at that time were: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Trinidad and Tobago, United States, and Venezuela. Member states not ratifying at that time were: Antigua and
Bermuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Chile, Dominica, Ecuador, Grenada, Haiti, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Saint Kitts and
Nevis, Suriname, and Uruguay. To date, all 35 member states have ratified the Protocol of Amendment." Id.
22. Lillich, supranote 16 at 782. The IACHR was to perform country studies and discuss human rights broadly.
It was not originally planned that the IACHR would handle individual complaints.
23. Id. The creators envisioned a group that would discuss human rights issues in an academic sense but it never
contemplated that individuals would find out about the IACHR and its function that quickly.
24. Id. The IACHR was the only organization in place to handle human rights issues in the Americas at its creation.
25. Id. at 783. The main objective of the Commission was not to investigate isolated violations but to document
the existence of these gross, systematic violations and to exercise pressure to improve the general condition of human
rights in the country concerned. For this purpose, and by means of its regulatory powers, the Commission created a
procedure to "take cognizance" of individual complaints and use them as a source of information about gross,
systematic violations of human rights in the territories of the OAS member states. See id.
26. See Pratdesaba Barillas v. Guatemala, Case No. 8074, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 45, OEA/ser.LJVJII,, doc. 95 rev.
7 (1996).
27. LILuCH, supra note 20, at784.
28. Id. "The IACHR viewed itself more as an international organ with a highly political task to perform than as
a technical body whose main task was to participate in the first phase of a quasi-judicial supervision of the observance
of human rights. The IACHR's past made it ill-prepared to efficiently utilize the additional powers the Convention
subsequently granted it." Id.
29. Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Art. 1[hereinafter referred to as Statute].
30. Inter-Am. C. H.R. Ann. Rep. (1996), OEA/ser.LJVJII., doc. 95, June 4, 1996.
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human rights."1 These rights are the same as those set forth in the American
Convention on Human Rights and the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.32
Furthermore, while the American Convention of Human Rights provides the
specific source of obligations with respect to the protection of human rights for
States Parties to that instrument, it must nevertheless 'be remembered that, given
the provisions of Article 29(d), these states cannot escape the obligations they
have as members of the OAS under the Declaration'.
The right to life, integrity, and personal liberty, and to the protection of judicial
guarantees are, among many others, issues of constant concern to the IACHR.
Consequently, when one person is deprived of his liberty in violation of the law,
the IACHR focuses it attention, in principle, on the observance of the state of the
due process protections in its own law and in the mechanisms used for detention.33
IACHR functions include: "(1) promoting human rights in all OAS member
states; (2) assisting in the drafting of human rights documents; (3) advising member
states of the OAS; (4) preparing country reports, which usually include visits to the
territories of these states; (5) mediating disputes over serious human rights problems;
(6) handling individual complaints and initiating individual cases on its own motion,
both with regard to states parties and states not parties to the Convention; and34 (7)
participating in the handling of cases and advisory opinions before the Court.,
For those states which are parties to the American Convention on Human
Rights, Article 19 of the statute discusses the IACHR's duties. These duties are

31. Statute,artl.
32. See DAVIDSON, supranote 16, at 29. The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man was adopted
by the Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogota, Colombia, 1948. OAS, Basic Documents
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEAISer.LJV/II.92, doc. 31, rev. 3, May 3, 1996 at 17.
33. Id. The First Committee of the General Assembly goes further to state that the situation could be far more
serious, when the legislation is the cause ofthe detentions occurring when it manifestly undercuts basic guarantees and
principles that should govern in a state under the rule of law: Trial of Civilians by military courts, the punishment of
crimes committed byminors, therestrictions onjudicialcontrol ofinvestigations, and theprolonged solitary confinement
of persons detained, often illegally, are still, unfortunately, procedures commonly applied in a few member states of the
Organization. The IACHR goes further to state they will continue to remind the states of the need to adapt their
domestic law to the international obligations to which they have freely consented. The IACHR adopts decisions and
makes general recommendations to protect the rights ofindividuals in order to minimize the effect of the violations that
derive from these other situations, based on the competence and procedures assigned to it by the Inter-American legal
instruments, whose nonperformance is quite often reflected in grave injustices to the persons affected. See id.
34. LLICH, supra note 16, at 785; See also Statute, art. 18.
35. Statute, Art. 19. The duties include the following:
1. To act on petitions and other communications, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 44 to 51 of the Convention;
2.
To appear before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in cases provided for in the Convention.
3.
To request the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to take such provisional measures as it considers
appropriate in serious and urgent cases which have not yet been submitted to it for consideration, whenever this
becomes necessary to prevent irreparable injury to persons;
4.
To consult the Court on the Interpretation of the American Convention on Human Rights or of other treaties
concerning the protection of human rights in the American states;
5.
To submit additional draft protocols to the American Convention on Human Rights to the General Assembly, in
order to progressively include other rights and freedoms under the system of protection of the Convention, and
6. To submit to the General Assembly, through the Secretary General, proposed amendments to the American
Convention on Human Rights, for such action as the General Assembly deems appropriate.
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unique to those Member states which have ratified the Convention. These duties
allow the IACHR more latitude in addressing the human rights disputes that come
before the commission.
For those State members of the Organization who are not a part of the American
Convention on Human Rights, Article 20 of the Statute outlines those powers of the
IACHR. 36 These duties are unique to those Member states that have not ratified the
Convention. These duties limit the IACHR's abilities in handling human rights
disputes that arise against Member states that have not ratified the Convention.
B. Ratification of the American Convention on Human Rights States Treaty
The OAS proposed the American Convention on Human Rights Treaty
(Convention) at San Jose, Costa Rica, which was adopted on November 22, 1969."7
The Convention addressed the human rights violations perpetrated against individuals
in the Americas.3 ' The Convention outlined exactly what rights are afforded
individuals.3 9 In the event of a violation of any of these rights, appropriate measures
are available to address these violations.40 Twenty-five signatories to the OAS have
ratified the Convention to date.41 Ten other signatories ratifying the Convention have

See id.
36. Id. at art. 20. Those powers are as follows:
1. To pay particular attention to the observance ofthe human rights referred to in Articles I, II, I1,IV, XVIII, XXV,
and XXVI of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man;
2.
To examine communications submitted to it and any other available information, to address the government of
any member state not a Party to the Convention for information deemed pertinent by this Commission, and to make
recommendations to it, when it finds this appropriate, in order to bring about more effective observance offundamental
human rights; and,
3. To verify, as a prior condition to the exercise of the powers granted under subparagraph b. above, whether the
domestic legal procedures and remedies of each member state not a Party to the Convention have been duly applied and
exhausted.
Id.
37. The American Convention of Human Rights [hereinafter cited as Convention] was opened for signature in San
Jose, Costa Rica, on November 22, 1969, and entered into force on July 18, 1978.
38. See id. at Preamble.
39. See id. at arts. 1-25.
40. See id. at arts. 34-51.
41. These signatories include Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica
(Commonwealth), Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad, Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. B-32:American
Convention on Human Rights, " Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica," OAS Inter-Amercian System of Legal Information
(visitedMay2l,1999) <http://www.oas.orgFENprogjuridico/english/Sigsb-32.html>. SeegenerallyCeciliaMedina,
TowardEffectiveness in the ProtectionoffHuman Rights in theAmericas, 8 TRANSNAT'LL. & CoNTeiMP. PRoBs. 337,
348-49 (1998); Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost ofSenatorlBricker, 89
AM. J. INT'LL. 341 (1995); Thomas Buergenthal, Modem Constitutionsand Human Rights Treaties, 36 CoLui. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 211 (1997).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol35/iss2/10

6

King-Hopkins: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Is Its Bark Worse Than

2000]

HUMAN RIGHTS

427

done so under certain reservations. 42 Ironically, the staunch supporter of human
rights, the United States, has yet to ratify the Convention.43
C. Composition/Dutiesof the IACHR
Under Article 2 of the IACHR Statute, the IACHR consists of seven members,
"who shall be persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the field

of human rights."'

There are three elected positions to the IACHR.45 The JACHR

42. These signatories include, Uruguay, Argentina, Barbados, Chile, El Salvador, Mexico, Venezuela,Trinidad and
Tobago, Dominica.
Uruguay Reservation: "Article 80.2 of the Constitution of Uruguay provides that a person's citizenship is suspended
if the person is "under indictment on a criminal charge which may result in a penitentiary sentence." Such a restriction
on the exercise of the rights recognized in Article 23 of the Convention is not envisaged among the circumstances
provided for in Article 23, paragraph 2, for which reason the Delegation of Uruguay expresses a reservation of this
matter." Id. at 2.
Argentina Reservation: "Article 21 is subject to the following reservation: TheArgentine Governmentestablishes that
ques tions relating to the Government's economic policy shall not be subject to review by an international tribunal.
Neither shall it consider reviewable anything the national courts may determine to be matters of 'public utility' and
'social interest', nor anything they may understand to be fair compensation." Id. at 2.
Barbados Reservations: "In respect of 4(4) the criminal code of Barbados provides for death by hanging as a penalty
for murder and treason. The Government is at present reviewing the whole matter of the death penalty which is only
rarely inflicted but wishes to enter a reservation on this point inasmuch as treason in certain circumstances might be
regarded as a political offence and falling within the terms of section 4(4)." "In respect of 4(5) while the youth or old
age of an offender may be matters which the Privy Council, the highest Court of Appeal, might take into account in
considering whether the sentence of death should be carried out, persons of 16 years and over or over 70 years of age
maybeexecutedunder Barbadianlaw." "Inrespect of8(2)(e) Barbadian lawdoes not provide as aminimum guarantee
in criminal proceeding any inalienable right to be assisted by counsel provided by the state. Legal aid is not provided
for certain scheduled offences such as homicide, and rape." Id. at 4.
Chile Reservation: "The Government of Chile declares that, when the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights apply the provisions of Article 21.2 of the Convention, they may not
make statements concerning the reasons of public utility or social interest taken into account in depriving a person of
his property." ld at 5.
El Salvador Reservation: "Ratificationis understoodwithoutprejudice to those provisions ofthe Convention that might
be in conflict with express precepts of the Political Constitution of the Republic." Id. at 7.
Mexico Reservation: "The Government of Mexico makes express reservation to Article 23, paragraph 2, since the
Mexican Constitution provides, in Article 130, that ministers ofdenominations shall not have an active or passive vote,
nor the right to associate for political purposes." lIdat 7.
Venezuela Reservation: "Article 60, paragraph 5 ofthe Constitution of the Republic ofVenezuela establishes that: No
one may be convicted in a criminal trial without first having been personally notified of the charges and heard in a
manner prescribed by law. Persons accused of an offense against the res publica may be tried in absentia, with the
guarantees and in the manner prescribed by law. Such a possibility is not provided for in Article 8,paragraph I of the
Convention." Id.
Trinidad and Tobago Reservation: "As regards Article 4(5) of the Convention, the Government of the Republic of
Trinidad and Tobago makes a reservation in that under the laws of Trinidad and Tobago there is no prohibition against
the carrying out a sentence of death on a person over seventy (70) years of age." Id.
Dominica Reservations: "Article 5 should not be read as prohibiting corporal punishment administered in accordance
with the Corporal Punishment Act of Dominica or the Juvenile Offenders Punishment Act." "Article 4.4 reservation
is made in respect of the words "or related common crimes." "Article 8.2(e), this article shall not apply in respect of
Dominca. "Article 21.2 must be interpreted in the light of the provisions of the Constitution of Dominica and is not
to be deemed to extend or limit the rights declared in the Constitution." "Article 27.1 must also be read in the light of
our Constitution and is not to be deemed to extend or limit the rights declared by the Constitution. "Article 62, the
Commonwealth of Dominica does not recognize the jurisdiction of the Court." Id.
43. Id.at2-10.
44. Statute, supranote 29, at art. 2.
45. Id. at art. 14. The officers include a Chairman, a First Vice-Chairman and a Second Vice-Chairman. These
officers are elected for one-year terms by absolute majority of the IACHR. Reelections are only allowed once over a
four-year period. The Secretariat and Executive Secretary are appointed positions.
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represents all member states of the OAS.46 Issues occasionally arise as to whether
members of the IACHR will act impartially and independently of their own countries
in reality when faced with cases involving their own countries.4 7 Members of the
IACHR have the burden of balancing between the rights of individuals being
infringed and their duty and loyalty to their home country. Political ties, economic

wealth, and position and status in the community also play roles in how members
decide human rights issues brought before the commission. When the financial
stability and status of members are threatened based on the outcome of cases, it will
very well be determinative of the outcome, or even consideration, of a case. This
results in difficulty in ascertaining whether the IACHR's decisions in cases are

unbiased.
Article 9 of the Statute outlines the duties of the members of the IACHR.48
Violations of these duties can result in removal from office. 49 However, a member
is allowed the opportunity to refute the charges before any such action is taken by the
IACHR. 50
D. Standing and Jurisdiction
"[A]ny person or group of persons, or nongovernmental entity legally
recognized in one or more of the OAS member states, regardless of whether the

complainant is the victim of a human rights violation" can bring a complaint against
an OAS member state. 5' Procedurally, individual and state complaints begin before
the IACHR. 52 Under Article 62(3) of the Convention, however, "the jurisdiction of

the Inter-American Court of Human Rights53 shall comprise all cases concerning the
interpretation and application of the provisions of the Convention that are submitted
to it, provided thatthe States Partiesto the case recognize or have recognized such
jurisdiction,whether by specialdeclarationpursuantto the precedingparagraphs,
or by a special agreement. 5 4 Read together with Article 62(3), Article 61 (1) of the

46. Statute, art. 3. See also DAVIDSON, supra note 16 at 101.
47. See LEBLANc, supra note 3, at 4.
48. Statute, art. 9. "The duties of the members of the Commission are:
1. Except when justifiably prevented, to attend the regular and special meetings the Commission holds at its
permanent headquarters or in any other place to which it may have decided to move temporarily.
2.
To serve, except when justifiably prevented, on the special committees which the Commission may form to
conduct on-site observations, or to perform any other duties within their ambit.
3.
To maintain absolute secrecy about all matters which the Commission deems confidential.
4.
To conduct themselves in their public and private life as befits the high moral authority of the office and the
importance of the mission entrusted to the Commission." Id.
49. Id art. 10.
50. See id. After extensive research, n6 information was available to determine if there have in fact been violations
causing removal of any member of the IACHR. Therefore, even ifa member has been in violation of any duties in
Article 9, there has been no action resulting in discipline or removal. It defeats the purpose to have provisions in place
to combat these problems if there is not an enforcement mechanism to see that the statutes are carried out.
51. Id.
52. See LIIucH, supra note 16, at 784.
53. See id. at 785, and note 46, supra.
54. Convention, Art. 62 (3); See also Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-AmericanCourtof Human Rights, 76 Am.
J. INT'LL. 231,236 (1982).
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Convention "declares that only the States Parties and the IACHR shall have the right
to submit a case to the Court."55 Individuals cannot bring actions to the Court
because they do not have standing.56 Furthermore, the Court cannot hear a case if the
parties have not consented to the Court's jurisdiction.5 7 The IACHR, however, has
authority to allow a state the opportunity to accept jurisdiction for a limited purpose,
but the State can decline if it so chooses. 8
Given the objectives of the Convention, the Court having jurisdiction of all cases
concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention's provisions is a
positive function of the Court. This allows the Court to interpret and apply the law
which can be helpful in future cases brought before that forum. A state's recognition
of the Court's jurisdiction should not be an issue. There should mandatory provisions
in the OAS Charter as well as the Convention, which give the Court power to hear
cases under any circumstances. Mandatory jurisdiction provisions will ensure that
states are held accountable for their actions, and reinforce the Court's power to
redress human rights violations.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights exercises two kinds of jurisdiction.
First, the Court has advisory jurisdiction, which allows the Court to interpret the
59
Convention as well as other treaties concerning human rights issues in the Americas.
It also has contentious jurisdiction, in which the Court adjudicates human rights
disputes to determine whether the state is in violation.6"
1. Advisory Opinion Jurisdiction
The Court has the power to give advisory opinions by three different methods.6 1
First, it can interpret the Convention when requested by any Member state or any
organ of the OAS.62 Second, member states can request opinions concerning other
treaties that affect human rights in the Americas.63 Third, the Court will entertain
requests brought by any Member state of the OAS in ascertaining potential conflicts
between the Member states' domestic laws and the laws of the Convention, or other
treaties, involving human rights protection in the Americas.'
As a result, when a Member state requests an advisory opinion, it must establish
its competency in the application and set forth why it chose to seek an opinion from
the Court. 65 The Court requires full information to render an informed opinion.6 6 If

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Convention, supranote 37, at art. 61(1).
See id.; see also Buergenthal, supranote 54, at 236.
See id. at 236.
Convention, Art. 61(1); See also Buergenthal, supranote 54, at 236.
See DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 232.
Convention, supranote 37, at art. 64.
See DAVIDSON, supra note 16,at 146.
See id. at 146-47.
See Buergenthal, supra note 54, at 243.
See id. at 245.
See DAViDSON, supra note 16, at 147.
See id.
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full information is not provided, however, the Court has discretion to decline
jurisdiction. 67
The Court's advisory jurisdiction to interpret treaties is limited to requests
involving member states of the OAS.68 If the ultimate purpose for the request
involves a non-American state's obligation under the treaty, the Court will decline
jurisdiction. 69 Invariably, there is nothing in the Convention, Statute, or Regulations of the Court that gives it power to reject cases that it considers "an abuse of the
process. ' 70 The Court must have a strong, compelling reason for not complying with
an advisory opinion request. 7' The Court decides whether an advisory opinion
'
request is admissible on a "case-by-case basis."72
This advisory form of jurisdiction is effective because it allows Member states
to seek interpretation of the Convention and other treaties from the Court which
informs the states whether it is in compliance with those treaties or the Convention.
This jurisdiction also allows the a Member state the opportunity to learn whether its
laws are in conflict with the laws of the Convention or other treaties, which may help
in resolving conflicts before human violations occur. The fact that the Court must
have a strong and compelling reason for not complying with an advisory opinion
request is also another positive characteristic of advisory jurisdiction. This allows
the Court to render opinions more often than not since declining will put the Court in
the position of having to explain its decision to decline.
The advisory form of jurisdiction, however, has weaknesses. First, the Court
will not recognize requests which involve a non-American state. Arguably, if the
purpose of the Court is to interpret the Convention, it should not matter whether it is
a Member state or non-American state if the reason for the request involves human
rights issues in the Americas. Second, the procedural formalities involved in
requesting an opinion may deter States from seeking advice from the Court.
2. Contentious Jurisdiction
The primary function of the Court is to rule on whether a particular Member
state has violated the human rights of an individual under the Convention and to

67. See id.
68. See id. at 244.
69. See id. at 244-45. "Although advisory opinions under Article 64(1) of the Convention are essentially
declaratory in nature, the Court has nevertheless recognized that its authoritative interpretations may have wider
implications for states which are notpartyto proceedings. This being so, the procedure in requests for advisory opinions
contains two important elements. First, the Secretary of the Court transmits copies ofthe request to any Member State
of the OAS 'which might be concerned in this matter.' In practice, all Member States of the OAS are sent copies ofthe
request. The request is sent to the Secretary-General ofthe OAS for transmission to the appropriate organs ofthe OAS
listed in Chapter VIII of the Charter who might have an interest in the proceedings. Second, all the states and organs
so notified are entitled to provide written observations or other documents on the matter which is the subject of the
request." Id at 147. See also Dinah Shelton, The JurisprudenceOf the Inter-American CourtofHuman Rights, 10
AM. UJ. IN'L L. & POL'Y 333,334.
70. See DAVMSON, supra note 16, at 235.
71. Seeid.at237.
72. Id.
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"secure redress for those violations." 73 This function of the Court has been
characterized as being "penal in nature."74 Contentious proceedings are fact-oriented,
and the decisions are usually binding on the violating state.75 State parties and the
'
IACHR are the only two entities allowed to bring "a contentious case."76
The Court cannot hear a contentious case unless, under Article 62(3) of the
Convention, a State Party or Parties submit to the Court's jurisdiction.77 The IACHR
has the same obligation as the Court, in requesting that a state that has not accepted
the jurisdiction of the Court to accept jurisdiction in a particular matter.7 8 A state's
acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction alone is not enough for the Court to exercise
its jurisdiction. 79 Before the Court may hear a case, the procedures under Articles 48
to 50 of the Convention must also be satisfied. 0 Once those procedures are satisfied,
the Court can entertain the case brought before it.
The fact that contentious proceedings are based on facts and produce a binding
decision is a strong attribute of this particular form of jurisdiction. It holds the
violating States accountable for its actions. Contentious jurisdiction finds a violation,
and awards redress to the victims of those violations. This gives the victims the
assurance that the Court acknowledges their claims and wants them to be compensated for their suffering.
Conversely, the jurisdictional requirement that a State Party must submit to the
court's jurisdiction in order for the Court to hear the case, is a weakness. If a State
Party is in violation of an individual's human rights, the Court should be allowed to
hear the case regardless of whether the State submits to the Court's jurisdiction. If
a State knows that action will not be taken by the Court because of this jurisdictional
requirement, then a State will not care if it violates an individual's rights. To make
Member States accountable for redressing those violations they commit, the
Convention should make it mandatory that States are automatically under the Court's
jurisdiction.
E. Petitions Brought Before the IACHR
The procedures for the IACHR to deal with a complaint brought before it are
set forth in Articles 48 to 50 of the Convention.8 ' There are a number of stages that
must occur in the litigation process. The IACHR must first determine whether the

73. See id. at 205; See also Shelton, supra note 69, at 343.
74. DAVIDSON, Supra note 16, at 205. JudgePiza Escalante has taken the view "that contentious jurisdiction has
'an obvious condemnatory nature, as in penal jurisdiction, whose specific object is not that of defining the right in
question but rather that ofre-establishing the violated right, specifically deciding whether there has been a violation of
the rights guaranteed by the Convention that can be imputed to a State Party ... ', the Court itself has refused to
characterize its contentious procedure as penal in nature." Id.
75. See id. at241.
76. Id.
77. Convention, supra note 39, at art. 62(3).
78. Id. at art. 50; See also DAVIDSON, supranote 16, at 205.
79. Convention, supra note 39, at art. 50.
80. Id. at art. 48-50.
81. See DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 155.
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petition is admissible.82 This stage requires the IACHR to decide whether the case
satisfies the requirements necessary to be heard.83 If deemed admissible, the case
proceeds to the second stage. During this stage, the IACHR investigates the facts
alleged, by means such as holding hearings and examining documents. 84 At this
point, the IACHR attempts to get the parties to resolve their dispute through friendly
settlement, in lieu of litigation.85 If the parties reach an impasse in the settlement
negotiations, the case moves on to the third stage86 The IACHR then writes a report
outlining the facts and its findings."87 The report is sent to "the states concerned" 88
and can be supplemented by the IACHR with "such proposals or recommendations"
that the IACHR deems necessary. 89 The case may be brought before the Court
during the three month period following the transmittal of the report, by the IACHR
or by the violating state. 90 According to Article 61(2), before the Court can
adjudicate a case, these procedures must be completed.9
These litigation steps are time consuming and will likely delay the process of
redressing the victim's rights. Bureaucratic red tape only makes matters worse. It
will take an enormous amount of time to investigate the matter. The procedural time
should be shortened so that the victims are afforded justice quickly.
Ill. THE IACHR IN PRACTICE
Four particular cases illustrate the practical application of the lofty goals of the
IACHR: (1) Victims of the Tugboat "13 de Marzo" vs. Cuba,2 (2) Pratdesaba
Barillas vs. Guatemala,9' (3) Rosario Congo vs. Ecuador,94 and (4) Montoya
Gonzalez v. Costa Rica.95
Victims of the Tugboat "13 de Marzo" vs. Cuba illustrates how the IACHR
handles a case involving human rights atrocities committed against individuals in a
country. PratdesabaBarillasvs. Guatemala displays just how serious some States
are about the Convention and the IACHR. Guatemala, for example, never cooperates
with the IACHR and is not pressed to mend its ways. Rosario Congo vs. Ecuador
discusses why informal settlement should not be used in cases of severehuman rights

82. Convention, art. 48.
83. See id.
84. Id. at art. 50.
85. Id. at art. 49.
86. Id. at art 50.
87. Convention, supra note 39, at art. 50(1).
88. See id. atart. 50(2).
89. See id. at art. 50(3).
90. See id. art. 51.
91. Id. at art. 61(2). "In order for the Court to hear a case, it is necessary that the procedures set forth in Articles
48 and 50 shall have been completed." Id.
92. Victims of the Tugboat"13 de Marzo" v. Cuba, Case 11.436, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 45, OEA/ser.LJV./II, doc. 95,
rev. 7 (1996).
93. Pratdesaba Barillas v. Guatemala, Case 8074, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 45, OEA/ser.L./VJII., doc. 95 rev. 7 (1996).
94. Rosario Congo v. Ecuador, Case 11.427, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 45, OEA/ser.LJVJII., doc. 95 rev. 7 (1996).
95. Montoya Gonzalez v. Costa Rica, Case 11.553, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 45, OEA/ser.LJVJII, doe. 95, rev. 7 (1996).
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violations and why punishment is the better approach to send a message that certain
behavior will not be tolerated.96 Montoya Gonzalez v. CostaRica examines what the
IACHR deems as adequate standing for a party to bring a case before it.97
The major lesson these cases teach is that the IACHR has more of a ministerial
role than an enforcement. Although in principle the IACHR was created to deal with
human rights disputes, in reality it has no power. As a ministerial organization, the
IACHR has no authoritative decision making capacity. Member states are not
obligated to abide by the suggestions of the IACHR. The best mechanism in place
to handle human rights disputes has limitations.98
A. Victims of the Tugboat "13 de Marzo" v. Cuba
On July 13, 1994, in Cuba, forty-one people were drowned trying to leave Cuba
when Cuban State boats used pressurized water hoses and prows to sink the
tugboat.9 9 The surviving victims and family members of the deceased victims brought
the complaint before the IACHR.I °° The IACHR's basis of jurisdiction for hearing
this petition was grounded in Article 51 of its regulations. 1"' IACHR felt competent
to hear the case beacuse it involved violations of rights embedded in the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man."2 This case arose in the midst of strife
and turmoil that has engulfed the people of Cuba since Fidel Castro took control over
03
thirty years ago.
The main issue before the IACHR was whether Cuba was internationally liable
for the deaths of the forty-one people by acting in such a way that the violation
occurred without prevention or care of human life."° Cuba argued that it had nothing
to do with the alleged events and that it was a terrible accident.' Cuba contended
that the owners of the tugboat were simply trying to recover their stolen tugboat.
Cuba also argued that the Cuban coastguard arrived after the other boats and tried
to assist the victims, but the tugboat was already sinking.' 6 Cuba blamed the United

96. See Rosario Congo, supra note 94.
97. See Montoya Gonzalez, supranote 95.
98. Convention, supra note 39, at art. 62(3).
99. Victims of the Tugboat "13 deMarzo" v. Cuba, Case 11.436, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 45, OEA/ser.LVJII, doc. 95,
rev. 7 (1996).
" [I]n the early morning hours of July 13, 1994, four boats belonging to the Cuban State and equipped
with water hoses attacked an old tug boat that was fleeing Cuba with 72 people on board. The incident occurred seven miles off the Cuban coast, opposite the port of Havana. The Complaint also
indicates the Cuban State boats attacked the runaway tug with their prows with the intention of
sinking it, while at the same time spraying everyone on the deck of the boat, including women and
children, with pressurized water. The pleas of the women and the children to stop the attack were
in vain, and the old boat-named "13 Marzo"-sank, with a toll of41 deaths, including ten minors.
Thirty-one people survived the events of July 13, 1994." IL
100. See id at para. 6.
101. See idatpara. 68.
102. See id.
103. SeegeneralyRHoDAP.RABKiNCuBANPoLmcs:TH-REvoLurroNARYExERMm 179-222(1991);HuttH
S.THOMAS ET AL, THE CuBAN REvOLUTION: 25 YEARS LATER 61-67 (1984).
104. See Victim of the Tugboat "13 de Marzo", supranote 92, at para. 67.
105. See id. at para. 29.
106. See id. at para. 28.
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States for the drownings since the victims were trying to seek refuge in the United
States.1 7 The petitioners contend that Cuban officials deliberately tried to drown
them with pressurized water from hoses. 0 8 Petitioners also contended that Cuba
would not allow them to recover the bodies of the drowned victims and that Cuba
state officials murdered innocent victims. 10 9
The IACHR recommended that Cuba find, prosecute, and punish those persons
responsible for the deaths and human rights violations committed."' It was also
recommended that compensation be paid to the surviving victims and to the bereaved
families for all damage, as well as for intentional emotional distress."' The IACHR
further recommended that the sunken boat be recovered by the Cuban Government
112
and any remains of bodies of the victims be handed over to their surviving relatives.
The JACHR reasoned that the eyewitness accounts as well as other evidence showed
that the sinking of the tugboat was not an accident but an intentional, calculated
act."' The IACHR found that Cuba did not investigate this matter and quickly
exonerated the parties responsible which was a compelling reason to find against
14
Cuba.
This case illustrates how the IACHR typically responds to complaints when
they are presented. Here, Cuba attempted to cooperate with the IACHR but had the
opportunity to do more than it did. Cuba could have allowed the victims' families to
retrieve their bodies and bring to justice those who were responsible for their deaths.
Cuba, however, chose not to do so. The IACHR only made recommendations to the
Cuban Government. It did not lay out the actual deadline to complete the recommendations. Based on this case, it would seem that a country has leeway to follow the
recommendations whenever it feels moved to do so, or to ignore the recommendations,
with no consequences, if so inclined. If there is nothing absolute as to when
recommendations must be carried out, resolution of human rights disputes cannot be
quickly and effectively resolved. There must be specific deadlines in place to ensure
prompt resolutions of disputes that arise. The IACHR needs to appoint individuals
to ensure that the cooperation with the recommendations, and to ensure that the
uncooperative, violating countries are reprimanded.
B. Pratdesaba Barillas v. Guatemala
On September 24, 1982, a Guatemalan citizen was abducted by Guatemalan
state agents and transported to several military bases. This individual still is

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See id. at para. 26.
See id. at para. 13.
See id. at para. 18-19.
See Victims of the Tugboat "13 de Marzo", supra note 92, at para. 108.
Seeid. atpara. 110.
See id. at para. 109.
See id. atpara. 82.
See id. at para.96.
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missing."5 Guatemala has neither investigated nor clarified the facts.116 The
victim's next-of-kin submitted the complaint to the JACHR. 117 The JACHR was able
to entertain the complaint since it alleged violations of the victim's rights under the
American Convention on Human Rights." 8
The JACHR forwarded the complaint to the Guatemalan government for a
response and granted several extensions." 9 The Guatemalan government has yet to
respond. 120 The petitioners argue that eyewitnesses saw military personnel in the
victim's vehicle. 12 ' Guatemala never answered the petition. 122 The IACHR
determined from the evidence that the victim was abducted by agents of the state.'"
IACHR recommended that the Guatemalan government conduct a thorough and
impartial investigation as to the abduction and disappearance of the citizen and
ascertain the identity of the people responsible.124 IACHR also recommended that
Guatemala make full reparations to the victim's family as well as make necessary
arrangements for the victim's family to find an appropriate final resting place for the

victim."z The IACHR also planned to publish Guatemala's lack of cooperation
regarding this case. 126 The IACHR thoroughly analyzed the rights violations in

rendering its recommendations.' 27
Barillasis a problematic case because it highlights the ineffectiveness of the
IACHR. Here, the JACHR unilaterally extended Guatemala's response time sixty
days, yet Guatemala failed to respond. If the IACBR had more power to enforce its
recommendations and orders, instead of a mere ministerial type role, countries like

115. See Pratdesaba Barilas v. Guatemala, Case No. 8074, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 45, OEA/ser.LJVJII., doe. 95 rev.
7 (1996) at para. 2-3.
"[O]n October 1, 1981, at 1:00 p.m., Dr. Francisco Jose Antonio Pratdesaba Barillas was abducted by
members of the Guatemalan National Army at the facilities of the private sanitarium he headed. He
was taken away in his own vehicle, a light yellow 1982 Ford Fairmont. The complaint states that Dr.
Pratdesaba Barillas was confined at the military base at Quetzatenango; he was later taken to a
military outpost in San Rafael Pie de la Cuesta, Department of San Marcos; he was then held at the
headquarters at the Military Police on the Berlin de Coatepeque Ranch, Department of Quetzaltenango.
The last place the petitioners learned he was being held was the Rafael Carrera Military Base in
Zacapa, Department of Zacapa. He was later seen by witnesses in December of 1981, in Guatemala
City, in a private vehicle, in the custody of armed men. The petitioners state that eyewitnesses saw
Dr. Pratdesaba Barillas' car in possession of persons from the Fifth Military Zone. The complaint
contends that Dr. Francisco Jose Antonio Pratdesaba Barillas is still missing, and the Guatemalan
State has neither investigated nor clarified the facts. A criminal complaint of kidnaping was filed
by Dr. Pratdesaba Barillas' next-of-kin on October 29, 1981, to ascertain his whereabouts, but the
action taken on the complaint was flawed and ineffective." Id.
116. See1d. atpara.8.
117. See id. atpara. 3.
118. See id at para. 9. Those rights include Articles 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 25 of the Convention.
119. Seeid. atpara.8.
120. See id. at para.6-7.
121. See Pratdesaba Barilla, supranote 39, at para. 19.
122. See id. at para.8.
123. See id. at para.20.
124. See id. at para. 46 (a).
125. See id. at para.46 (b).
126. See id. atpara. 47.
127. See Pratdesaba Barilla, supranote 39, at para. 21-40. The IACHR found that Guatemala violated the victims
right tojuridical personality; right to life; right to humane treatment; right to personal liberty; right to die process of law
and to judicial protection; and obligation to respect and ensure rights. Id.
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Guatemala would be more apt to take the allegations brought against it more
seriously, especially if stiffer penalties were in put in place for lack of cooperation.
The prestige of the IACHR weakens when it cannot admonish a country to follow
directives or at the very least to respond to the Commission in a timely fashion.
Repeated requests to a country for response leaves an inference that if it does not even
respond to allegations, it can flaunt the recommendations that the IACHR imposes
upon it. The IACHR cannot be effective in resolving human rights disputes when it
cannot get a country to cooperate with the process.
In order for the IACHR to effectively resolve human rights disputes, it should
implement serious penalties against uncooperative violating countries. If stiffer
penalties are in place and enforced, then those violating countries will be more apt to
cooperate in the process and take the IACHR more seriously. Serious penalties
should include, but not be limited to: (1) substantial monetary fines against the
violating countries; (2) automatic monetary damages from the violating countries to
the victims or families of the victims; and (3) suspension or even termination from the
OAS if repeated uncooperative behavior is noted.
C. Rosario Congo v. Ecuador
On September 14, 1990, a mentally ill prisoner at the Machala Social
Rehabilitation Center was beaten and denied medical care which by agents of the
Center in Machala, Ecuador, injuries which lead to his death.'28 The victim's
attorney brought a petition before the IACHR.
The petitioners argued that the state was liable for the victim's death since the
guards were state agents.'2 9 Petitoners further alleged that police investigations were
not done properly and in manner to cover up the conduct of the state. 30 The
Ecuadorian state responded to the complaint by affirmatively acknowledging that the
prisoner was indeed beaten and denied medical care which led to his death."' The
prisoner's death was the result of negligence on the part of the responsible
authorities. 132 The IACHR recommended that the parties initiate proceedings for a
33
friendly settlement within 30 days following the notification of the present report.

128. See Rosario Congo v. Ecuador, Case No. 11.427, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 45, OEA/ser.L./V./II., doc. 95 rev. 7
(1996).
On September 14, 1990, Victor Rosario Congo, a prisoner at the Machala Social Rehabilitation
Center who was mentally ill, was assaulted with a garrote by guards at the center, causing him
serious injury. Despite his condition, the prisoner was stripped naked, placed in solitary confinement, and denied medical care. Medical examiners from the District Attorney confirmed
Victor Congo's condition, stating that he had welts on his body caused by the flaying and a
contusion that was dirty and caked with mud. Victor Congo was transferred to the Men's
Social Rehabilitation Center in Guayaquil, then to Luis Vernaza Hospital, where he died a
few hours later. Prior to the death of Victor Rosario Congo, nongovernmental organizations
had requested, through various avenues, that he be moved to a hospital so that he could receive
proper medical care. Id.
129. See id. atpara. 1.
130. See id. atpara. 27.
131. Seeid. atpara.21.
132. See id. at para. 21.
133. See id. at para. 54.
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of this case to be suitable for friendly settlement, a
The IACHR considered the 1facts
34
explained.
decision it never
This case illustrates one government's effort to cooperate with the IACHR.
Ecuador did not deny involvement in the beating of the prisoner. Perhaps even more
interesting, the IACHR actually gave a deadline for the parties to initiate proceedings
for a friendly settlement. What was not addressed by the IACHR was the possibility
of the parties not reaching a friendly settlement. Also disturbing is the type of cases
referred for friendly settlement. In egregious cases of human rights violations, such
as executions, severe beatings, or body dismemberments, friendly settlement is not an
effective tool. There is nothing "friendly" about the reason the parties are coming
together and it will be highly unlikely that such a dispute can be resolved in this
manner. In Rosario Congo, a man was severely beaten and denied medical care
which subsequently led to his death at the hands of government agents.135 A friendly
settlement should not be the answer in situations such as these. The better alternative
is to send a message that this conduct will not be tolerated. This message should
come in the form of a hearing before the IACHR, and, if not resolved at that level, the
Inter-American court should ensure compliance with the recommendations imposed
on that violating country.
It has become more common for the IACHR to deal with situations involving
military officials who commit human rights abuses. Government continue to argue
that they are not responsible for the actions of those military personnel. This is a
difficult problem for IACHR. For the most part, the IACHR has found that
governments are responsible for the actions of individuals that are acting under the
title of the state.
Political groups also seem to be a ready target for human rights violations.
Especially when those political groups may oppose the present government36
infrastructure or if the government feels that the group is a threat to its existence.
The IACHR still has much work ahead to establish a system that will enable political
groups to be free from oppression.
D. Montoya Gonzalez v. Costa Rica
On August 28, 1993, in Costa Rica, a female athlete wanted to compete in a
marathon that had established categories for men but none for females. 137 The Center

134. See Rosario Congo v. Ecuador, supranote 94, at para. 52.
135. See id.
136. See Patriotic Union v. Colombia, Case No. 11.227, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 45, OEA/ser.LJV.II, doc. 95, rev. 7
(1997) (political party alleged that its membership suffered persecution in the form of extrajudicial executions,
disappearances, unfounded criminal prosecutions by government).
137. See Montoya Gonzalez v. Costa Rica, Case No. 11.553, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 45, OEA/ser.LJVJII, doc. 95, rev.
7 (1996).
On August 28, 1993, the municipality of Heredia and the Costa Rican Federation of Athletics
organized the Second Municipal Race. The rules for the 12 kilometer, in Article 11, excluded
the categories of "juveniles" and "veterans" for female runners although these categories were
established for male runners. Article 19 of these rules established a first place prize for male
runners in the amount of 20,000 Costa Rican colones whereas the first place prize for female
runners was set at 10,000 colones. The second place prize was for male runners was set at
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for Justice and International Law and the Asociacion Ventana and Disabled People

International brought the petition before the IACHR on behalf of Mrs. Montoya.'38
The main issue before the IACHR was whether Mrs. Emerita Montoya suffered a

violation of any right guaranteed by the Convention as a consequence of Costa Rica's
actions.139 The petitioners argued that the government discriminated against female
athletes by not affording the same privileges granted to male athletes. 4 '

The

government of Costa Rica argued that the case was inadmissible for the IACHR to
hear because the facts did not support a violation under the Convention.41 '
The IACHR concluded that Mrs. Montoya did not have standing to bring this
action because she did not fall under "veterans" category; therefore she would not
be eligible to win a prize. 4 2 The IACHR held that the standing requirement,
although liberal, should not be "interpreted to mean" that the Commision could
decide such an abstract controversy. An individual cannot institute an actio
popularis and present a complaint against a law without establishing some active
legitimation justifying his standing before the Commission. It is not sufficient for
an applicant to claim that the mere existence of a law violates her rights under the
43
Convention. 1
All countries need to address the issues of equal protection of women and

minorities. The IACHR needs to focus considerable attention on OAS states that
treat women as second-class citizens. 4'
This case illustrates how the IACHR handles violations of equal protection
issues. The IACHR failed to grasp the real issue in the case. Mrs. Montoya brought
this petition before the IACHR because of the disparate treatment between male and
female athletes in a marathon race. 4 5 Her ineligibility in the different categories was

15,000 colones, whereas the second place prize for female runners was only 5,000 colones.
In addition, the rules contemplated a third place only for male runners, and the prize was
10,000 colones, equivalent to the first place prize for female runners. The applicant stated
that Mrs. Emerita Montoya registered to run the race but without any possibility of obtaining
a prize in case she would have been first in her category since the rules had eliminated her
category ("veterans") for female runners. The domestic law of the Costa Rica, in particular,
Decree Law number 191189-c, provides that all competitive sports must provide equal prizes
for men and women. Applicant alleges that Costa Rican law promotes equality between men
and women and does not allow for arbitrary discrimination based on sex. Applicant further
alleges that the law is not observed in practice as is shown by the activities of state authorities,
such as the municipality of Heredia, which organize discriminatory footraces. Id.
138. See id. at para. 3.
139. See id. at para. 1.
140. See id. atpara. 8.
141. Seeid. atpara. 12.
142. See id.at para. 30. Mrs. Montoya was 36 years old at the time of the marathon race she wanted to enter. The
"veterans" category was female runners 40 years and above. In fact, there was evidence presented that the winners of
the "adult" category ofwhich Mrs. Montoya was a part, were the ages of36, 33 and 26. Therefore, there was a chance
that Mrs. Montoya could have won or placed in the race and been eligible for a prize. See id.
143. See Montoya, supra note 95, at para. 28.
144. See Medina, supra note 41, at 348-49.
145. See Montoya, supra note 95, at para. 1.
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incidental to the main issue of women being treated unequally to men. 146 The IACHR
was looking for a way out of addressing the issue.
Pursuant to Article 44 of the Convention, a complaint can be brought against
an OAS member state in violation of human rights, by "any person or group of
persons, or nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more of the OAS
member states, regardless of whether the complainant is the victim of a human rights
violation." 4 7 The IACHR concluded that Mrs. Montoya's human rights were not
violated.1 4 ' Therefore, it is disputable that Mrs. Montoya did not have standing to
bring this action against Costa Rica. The Convention clearly addresses the issue that
149
the one bringing a suit does not have to be a victim of a human rights violation.
Mrs. Montoya would have that right to bring an action.
According to the Convention, all women would have standing to bring an action
before the IACHR regarding the unequal treatment of women and men athletes in this
case. 5 ' Had the IACHR considered this case in a broader context, it would have
been clear that the main issue in this case was addressing the inequalities of the men
and women athletes and not whether Mrs. Montoya had suffered a human rights
violation directly. In fact, in this case the IACHR itself infringes on the rights of an
individual to bring an action against discriminate treatment.
IV. MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH IACHR'S HANDLING OF PETITIONS
These cases illustrate the small problems inherent in IACHR's handling of
petitions. IACHR, however, has larger problems. First, complaints can only be
handled if all domestic remedies have been exhausted."5 ' This requirement prevents
swift reactions to violations, and if an individual's rights are seriously threatened,
help is not available in a timely fashion. As a result, grievous human rights atrocities
sometimes go unanswered.' 52
Second, the lack of cooperation and forthrightness from the member states in
violation of human rights is a serious obstacle for the IACHR. The governments will
either not respond to the IACHR's request for information or they may answer with
15
a blanket denial that doesn't contribute to a satisfactory solution to the problem.
As a consequence, there is no accountability by the States.

146. See id.
147. Convention, supra note 39, at art. 44.
148. See Montoya, supra note 95, at para.28.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Regulations of the Inter-Am. C. H. R., art. 37 [hereinafter cited as REGULATIONS].
152. See, e.g., Pratdesaba Barillas,supra note 93, at para. 1; Victims of the Tugboat "13 de Marzo v. Cuba, supra
note 92, at para. 1.
153. See e.g., Pratdesaba Barillas, supranote 93, at para. 1; Victims of the Tugboat "13 de Marzo v. Cuba, supra
note 92, at para. 1.
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Third, theIACHR avoids major, controversialissues. 5 4 The IACHR either will
address an incidental issue or deny standing. When this happens, there is no other
mechanism in place for an individual to bring an action.
Finally, the enforcement mechanism of the IACHR leaves much to be desired.
The IACHR makes recommendations to states being found in violation but provides
no time frames for the implementation of recommendations. Violating parties must
be subjected to strict deadlines tp ensure that recommendations are timely satisfied.
V. CONCLUSION
The Convention attempts to establish guidelines for acceptable treatment of
individuals in a context that resembles a constitution for the OAS Member States to
follow. It seems contrary, however, to establish a treaty for Member States to follow
while States have the option of whether to ratify it or not. This calls into question the
commitment of the OAS to stop atrocities committed against individuals in the
Americas.
Consequently, the Convention is ineffective when Member States that have

ratified it maintain broad reservations. There is little purpose to establishing rules
and procedures when States arbitrarily decide which rules they will and will not abide
by. Human rights disputes are difficult to resolve and enforce when States are not
required to adhere to the entire Convention. More disturbing is the refusal of the
United States to ratify the Convention. It is ironic that the country that proclaims

itself the champion for human rights causes has yet to ratify the Convention to
address human rights issues.' 5 5
Conversely, despite the problems of the Convention, it addresses many
controversial human rights areas.' 56 The Convention acknowledges the IACHR as

154. See generallyMontoya, supranote 95.
155. According to the Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott in a Remarks and Press Q & A on 1997 Country
Report on Human Rights, "The challenge that the United States and the international community face in Iraq is a
powerful illustration of why the United States must continue to make support for human rights a cornerstone of our
diplomacy. It's a basic premise ofour foreign policy that governments that respect the dignity and freedom of their own
citizens are much more likely to be responsible members of the international community." Acting Secretary of State
Strobe Talbott and Assistant Secretaryfor Democracy,Human Rights, and LaborJohn Shattuck, Remarks and
Press Q & A on 1997 Country Report on Human Rights (visited October 28, 1999)
<http:llwww.state.gov/wwwlpolicy-remarksl1998>; See also NATALiEHEvENER KAUFAN,HuSiaN
TREATJEs
ANDTHE SENATE 204-05 (1990). The author points out the arguments against U.S. ratification of human rights treaties.
The reasons, state in pertinent part: "(I) human rights treaties reflect a lower standard than is currently guaranteed; they
will take away U.S. rights and protections; (2) human rights treaties violate constitutional protection of states' rights.
They will give the federal government powers mean to be retained by the states; (3) human rights treaties are being used
to move toward world government; (4) human rights treaties foster communism, soviet policies, and socialist rights;
(5) subjects citizens to trial abroad; (6) human rights treaties will erode fundamental governmental powers; (7) human
rights treaties contain subjects that infringe on domestic matters; (8) human rights treaties are a creation of the United
Nations, which is a suspect organization, and will draw us into matters that should not concern us; (9) create selfexecuting obligations; (10) human rights treaties contain only the rights we already have and provide no additional
protections for U.S. citizens; (11) experts say that human rights treaties should hot be ratified; and (12) diminish the
rights of U.S. women." Id.
156. Convention, supra note 39, at art. 20. For example, it addresses the execution of persons under the age of
eighteen years old and those persons over the age of seventy; right to a fair trial; freedom of conscience and religion;
right to participate in government; right to equal protection; and right to judicial protection. Id.
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well as the Inter-American Court on Human Rights.157 Recognition of these two
entities were milestones for the Convention, as these two organizations were created
to resolve human rights disputes and enforce decisions rendered.158
Since the formation of the IACHR, there have been notable changes in the
approach to human rights violations and the manner in which the IACHR deals with
those violations. In the Annual Report of the IACHR for 1996, the IACHR denotes
"the continued spread of human rights and democracy, which are deeply rooted in the
peoples of the Hemisphere."159
Dean Claudio Grossman, Chairman of the IACHR, referred to "a new
hemispheric situation due to the existence of democratically elected governments
throughout the Americas.' 16 ' Dean Grossman stated:
The IACHR must gear its working procedures to this positive development, which
made for a qualitatively different and improved climate in comparison with
primarily to massive
previous eras in which the IACHR had to direct its attention
6
1
rights.1
human
essential
of
violations
systematic
and
Dinah Shelton, a professor of law at Notre Dame opines that:
Both the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court are able to
take immediate measures and sometimes do so with speed unparalleled in other
human rights institutions...Of the necessary requirements for an effective
international human rights system, the Commission performs fact-finding best.'62
The IACHR has an overwhelming interest in methods of ascertaining the truth
regarding human rights violations, and "understands the importance of combating
impunity through cases that reveal in detail the violations of human rights that some
countries have endured."' 63 As a result, the IACHR has taken necessary and effective
steps, following the due process of the law, in identifying and punishing government
agents responsible for human violations and in making appropriate and effective
reparations to the victims of those violations. 6" Further, there have been "major
reforms on the judiciary, regarding judicial administration, professional training for

157. See LILUCH, supra note 16 at 785.
158. See id.
159. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Report ofthe Commission 1996, OEA/ser.L/VJII.95, doc. 7, Press Release, (March
1996).
160. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Report of the Commission, 1996, OEA/ser.LVJII. 95, doe. 7 Press Release (July
1996).
161. Id.
162. See BtRERt ENTHAL, supranote 4, at 146-47 (quoting Dinah Shelton, Improving Human Rights Protections:
Recommendationsfor Enhancingthe Effectiveness of the Inter-American Commission andInter-American Court
of Human Rights, 3 Azt. UJ. INT'L L. & POL'Y 323, 329 (1988)).
163. Convention, art. 50 (2).
164. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Report of the Commission 1996, OEA/ser.L./VJII.95, doc. 7, Press Release, (July
24, 1996).
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judges, and the establishment of a legal procedure for challenging the constitutionality
of laws."' 6 5
The JACHR has also made recommendations to member states in which full
observance of the human rights set forth in the American Declaration of the Rights

and Duties of Man and the American Convention on Human Rights need to be met. 166

The IACHR is the only organ that deals with petitions if a state has not ratified the
American Convention or declared its acceptance of the Inter-American Court's

Compulsory jurisdiction.
Despite its progress, the IACHR faces major problems. IACHR must deal with
the stigma that members are biased towards their own countries.' 67 The Charter
states that the members are suppose to be persons of high moral character and
recognized competence in the field of human rights. 168 The IACHR needs to enforce
its recommendations more quickly, disperse with the unilateral extensions to countries
in answering charges brought against it, and it needs to address the issues presented

before it without ruling a case inadmissible when it is a case that the IACHR is able
to hear. 69 Another area of concern for the IACHR is the lack of funding and staffing

of the Commission. 170 The IACHR's only has twelve permanent staff lawyers who
cover a hemisphere of 900 million individuals.' With limited funding, the IACHR
and the Court only meet two to three times a year.'72 This makes it hard to give
adequate attention to each case for a speedy and satisfactory resolution."'7 3 Only with

165. See id.; see also Dinah Shelton, Remedies in the Inter-AmericanSystem, 92 AM. SOC'Y INT'LL. PRoc. 202,
204-05 (1998).
166. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Report of the Commission 1996, OEA/ser.L./VJII. 95, doc. 7 (1996). These
recommendations include:
1. That the member states take the steps to advance and consolidate the administration ofjustice in their domestic
legal systems.
2.
That themember states takerneasures to strengthen the ability oflaw enforcement agencies and personnel to fulfill
their mission to maintain the peace and provide security while fully respecting the protected rights and freedoms of the
individuals within their charge.
3.
That the member states develop new initiatives in favor of protecting the rights of children, who, by reason oftheir
status and vulnerability, are entitled to special protection to safeguard their development.
4.
That the member states of the OAS develop and amplify measures to counter and eradicate gender-based
discrimination.
5.
That the member states take the necessary steps both internally and through the OASjuridical and political bodies
to review the Commission's proposal for an "American Declaration on the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples" in order to
achieve consensus and the adoption of such an instrument at the 1998 General Assembly meeting commemorating the
'
5 0 anniversary of the OAS and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.
6. That the member states devote renewed effort to evaluating the effects of racial discrimination, which continues
to prevent individuals in various countries of our hemisphere from fully enjoying their human rights, and to the design
of mechanisms to more responsively address the problem.
7.
That the member states take the steps required to remedy inhuman conditions in prisons and to minimize the
number of pre-trial detainees.
Id.
167. See LEB.ANC, supranote 5, at 3.
168. Convention, supranote 39, at art. 34; See also DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 101.
169. See e.g., Pratdesaba Barillas, supra note 93, at para. 1; Montoya, supra note 95, at para. 1.
170. See Claudio Grossman, Strengtheningthe Inter-AmericanHuman Rights System: The CurrentDebate, 92
AM. SOC'Y INT'LL. PROC. 186,191 (1998).
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id.
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changes can the IACHR continue to play a major role in making progress against
human rights violations. The IACHR must step forward and make its voice one to be
reckoned with.
Kimberly D. King-Hopkins
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